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Public Opinion, Social Cohesion, and the Politics of Immigration in South 
Korea 
 
 
Abstract: 
This article analyses public opinion in order to explore the politics of immigration in South 
Korea. It argues that there are divergent views about immigration and the obligations of the 
host society to accommodate migrants. Younger, better-educated citizens are representative of 
a majority that has a generally positive view of immigrants and immigration. A sizeable 
minority of older and less well-educated citizens, however, is warier of immigration and its 
effects on South Korean society. Men were more likely than women to have a positive view of 
immigration, but the differences along gender lines were small. The article also finds that 
attitudes towards immigration depend to a significant degree on how migrants are described. 
It thereby highlights the possibility that South Korea’s leaders could use immigration for 
political gain while also seeking to attract new migrants in order to resolve the country’s 
economic and demographic problems. 
 
The Rise of Immigration in South Korea 
This article analyses the politics of immigration in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). 
Immigration expands the size and constitution of a political community, so it is inherently 
political. Most governments make some gestures towards accommodating the legitimate 
concerns of non-citizens, and are generally mindful of public opinion in doing so. Unlike other 
societies that have well-established overseas diasporas such as Israel or Ireland, South Korea 
has only become a destination for inbound immigration in recent decades. The ROK’s 
‘racialised’ notion of ethnicity has been defined in terms of bloodlines rather than birthplace 
(Choi, 2014; C. Lee, 2003; Shin, 2006), so it has traditionally been difficult to incorporate non-
ethnic Koreans into the body politic. The rise of immigration is therefore a challenge to the 
long-standing national mythology of Korea being a ‘homogenous and united country’ or 
‘unitary race’ (danil minjok gukka). 
 
From a low base, both permanent and temporary migration has grown quickly. The number of 
foreign residents in South Korea in 2013 was 1.57 million, up from 1.17 million four years 
earlier. This means that foreigners constituted 3.14% of the resident population, up from 2.35% 
in 2009 (KIS Statistics, 2014, p. 278). The main reason that the migrant community has 
increased so quickly is economic necessity: by some estimates, millions of immigrants will be 
needed in the next three decades in order to maintain a viable workforce in sectors such as 
agriculture, hospitality and manufacturing (Choi, 2014, p. 99). Immigration has also been 
touted as a partial remedy to a demographic crisis in South Korea, which has one of the lowest 
birth rates in the world (The Economist, 2015). So migrant women, who are sometimes termed 
‘marriage migrants’, account for a disproportionate share of live births in the ROK. A report 
commissioned by the Joongang Ilbo newspaper found that ‘by 2020, one in five Koreans under 
the age of 20 will be of mixed racial extraction, as will be one in three newborn’ (Choi, 2014, 
p. 97). Refugees from North Korea represent another key element of immigration to South 
Korea. From less than 1,000 at the turn of the millennium, their cumulative number has doubled 
every few years thereafter. By 2005 there were almost 8,000 North Koreans in the ROK, and 
that number increased to 15,000 by 2008. As of June 2015 about 28,000 refugees had resettled 
in the ROK (Ministry of Unification, 2015a, 2015b). Furthermore, in 2012 South Korea became 
the first East Asian state to sign the International Convention on Refugees, and to promulgate 
a refugee law. On a small scale, therefore, the ROK has begun to admit refugees from societies 
other than North Korea (S.-J. Lee, 2015).  
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The government has devised policies to accommodate the growing number of foreign workers, 
and formalised these measures in the 2003 Act on Foreign Workers’ Employment (Shim, 2013). 
In April 2006, South Korea outlined policies to cater to not only migrant workers but also 
international families. For one observer, this was the ‘first integrated governmental plan for 
multicultural society’ (Ahn, 2012, p. 100). These types of measures generally accord with the 
multiculturalist interpretation of immigrant integration. Some argue, however, that the ROK 
has not genuinely embraced its foreign population (Chung, 2010; Im & Kim, 2014; C. Lee, 
2012). Instead of ‘coexistence’ between a dominant culture and a foreign population, 
newcomers are expected to assimilate smoothly into the otherwise homogenous polity (Chung, 
2010, p. 651). This interpretation of immigrant integration is informed by a communitarian 
logic. 
 
Immigration policy contains both impulses towards accommodating new residents and citizens, 
but also towards protecting the essence of the Korean character and social fabric. If the 
approach of policymakers to issues such as immigration is somewhat contradictory, public 
opinion is also likely to be divided to some degree. Public opinion does not need to be in full 
accordance with public policy on every issue, but governments – especially those in democratic 
societies – generally base their legitimacy in part on the claim that they govern on behalf of the 
public. This article analyses public opinion surveys in order to ascertain the degree to which 
popular opinion is aligned with public policy, the degree of consensus within South Korean 
society about immigration, and the main points of contention in debates about immigration. By 
doing so, the article also seeks to ascertain whether the multiculturalist or communitarian logic 
is more evident in public opinion. Finally it discusses how public opinion might affect the 
future politics of immigration in the ROK. 
 
The politics of immigration 
Democratic societies can and do admit new members, and this can revitalise the body politic. 
For liberal political theorists such as Robert Dahl (2000), the key principle of democracy is that 
all members of a political community treat each other as equals. So long as new members of a 
polity subject themselves to the rule of law, there are no arbitrary restrictions (such as gender, 
race, religion or class) to their becoming citizens (Im & Kim, 2014, p. 12). Some democratic 
states practice multiculturalism, which is based on cosmopolitan political theory. 
Cosmopolitanism argues that democracy is a universal value that all people have the right to 
enjoy, whether they are citizens of a specific nation-state or not. In this view, states privilege 
their own citizens over all other people, and genuine democracy requires a more generous 
attitude to non-citizens (Beck, 2000; Held, 2003). Here, the conception of citizenship is 
horizontal: it assumes that all members of the political community are equal, regardless of 
gender, race, class or creed (Seol & Skrentny, 2009), and that there is sufficient democratic 
space for new citizens to protect their cultural practices within the host society. This is a ‘thin’ 
or universalist notion of citizenship. Individuals do not need to hold a particular cultural 
identity in order to be citizens: their civic identity may be entirely separate from their national 
disposition (Turner, 2001). 
 
Some argue that multiculturalism is generally understood in Western terms, whereby ‘identity 
politics’, or the mobilisation on racial, religious and cultural grounds in order to demand 
recognition of identity, is relatively common (Kymlicka & He, 2005, p. 3). A conception of 
state–society relations that implies that minority groups are powerful enough to maintain 
distinct cultural identities is far from being universally accepted. Some East Asia societies, for 
instance, see powerful minority groups as a threat to the sovereignty, or a possible ‘fifth column’ 
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for other states (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 29). Multiculturalism, therefore, means different things to 
different places, including Asia: ‘managing diversity is... key to political stability in the region’ 
(Kymlicka & He, 2005, p. 3). Most research on how democratic societies cope with 
immigration has been conducted in Europe and North America (Wright & Bloemraad, 2012, p. 
77), to the detriment of other regions. Multiculturalism must therefore be understood in local 
terms, as it has been in South Korea in recent years (Ahn, 2012).  
 
States whose immigration policies are informed by communitarian theory, meanwhile, attach 
strict conditions on citizenship. Communitarians seek to preserve the correspondence between 
national boundaries and the political community, which is narrowly defined in terms of 
ethnicity, language and race. This ‘thick’ notion of citizenship emphasises cultural similarity 
and collective sentiments (Turner, 2001). Citizenship is therefore a privilege that may be 
granted to non-citizens. Immigrants must become citizens in order to be accountable to their 
fellow residents, and thereby benefit from the democratic system (Hammar, 1990; Spinner, 
1995). The conception of citizenship, therefore, is vertical or hierarchical, in that new citizens 
have to ‘earn’ the rights that older citizens automatically enjoy by dint of birthright (Seol & 
Seo, 2014; Seol & Skrentny, 2009). The ‘Asian values’ critique, which emphasises the 
differences between Asia and the liberal, individualist West, endorses the communitarian logic. 
Multiculturalism may not be an accurate depiction of how most Asian societies approach 
citizenship, nationality and immigrant integration, but the Asian values critique presumes that 
a strong central state will enforce a singular and unifying narrative of national identity. In some 
Asian societies, however, distinct sub-national identities have coexisted with coherent national 
identities (Kymlicka & He, 2005, p. 6). 
 
Studies of immigration policy in South Korea indicate that the logic of communitarianism is 
relatively strong in the policy realm. Critics of the government’s handling of immigration 
policy say that the ROK has not devised policies that cater to the genuine needs of migrants 
(Chung, 2010; Im & Kim, 2014; C. Lee, 2012). The Second Basic Plan on Immigration Policy 
claims to adopt a ‘balanced’ approach to immigration (Immigration Policy Commission, 2013, 
p. 23), but commits South Korea to welcoming migrants on an instrumentalist basis. The 
government has expressed concern about the high proportion of foreign workers who are 
unskilled or who overstay their visas, and the cost of settling the families of migrant workers 
(Immigration Policy Commission, 2013, p. 16). 
 
There have been few comprehensive studies on how the public views immigration, and whether 
or not public opinion maps neatly on to immigration policy. One group of studies, which adopt 
the migrant perspective, suggest that the South Korean public has not been sympathetic to the 
difficulties that migrants face in integrating into their new society. North Korean refugees 
struggle to adapt to life in the ROK (Cho, 2012); have low income levels and job prospects 
(Bidet, 2013; Sohn, 2013); and endure poor physical health and discrimination (Jeong & Chae, 
2014; Sung & Go, 2014). About 20% of ethnic Korean–Chinese migrants, meanwhile, said that 
they were not easily accepted in South Korea; that they were subjected to suspicion and 
hostility for being foreigners; and that they were insulted for no clear reason (Seol & Skrentny, 
2009, pp. 161–162). The media tends to depict immigrants to the ROK in broadly sympathetic 
terms, but confirms the narrative that they are ‘victims’ who are vulnerable to abuse and 
discrimination (Park, 2014). For its part, the government claims that ‘Most Koreans still do not 
recognize or embrace cultural diversity [...] prompting growing concerns over an identity crisis 
among immigrants and their children who fail to fully grasp Korean social values’ 
(Immigration Policy Commission, 2013, p. 20). 
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Another group of studies have considered how public opinion about immigration is affecting 
conceptions of national identity. Some scholars detect the emergence of a new ‘hierarchy of 
citizenship’ (Seol & Seo, 2014), for instance, whereby locally born-and-bred South Koreans 
consider themselves to be superior to North Koreans and mixed-race Koreans. Such meta-
analyses of attitudes towards immigration illustrate that citizenship is a privileged concept. 
This article seeks to ascertain how widespread such sentiments are, and which segments of 
public opinion are most likely to adopt more and less exclusive notions of citizenship. Just as 
there are elements of Western European societies that oppose immigration on the grounds that 
it threatens social cohesion, so have some South Korean nationalists resisted proposals to 
expand the possibility of non-ethnic Koreans attaining citizenship of the ROK (Yi & Jung, 
2015). These incidences of overt opposition to immigration indicate that there is some degree 
of anti-immigrant sentiment in the ROK. To better understand the politics of immigration, 
including the possibility that political leaders may seek to mobilise electoral support by 
appealing to anti-immigrant sentiment, this article undertakes a more detailed analysis of public 
opinion. 
 
Data and Methods 
This article uses survey research in order to identify trends in public opinion about immigration 
in South Korea. Surveys provide ‘accurate information about a population by obtaining a 
representative sample of that population and using the information from the sample to make 
generalizations about the whole population’ (Burnham, Gilland, Grant, & Layton–Henry, 2008, 
p. 97). Political scientists often rely on surveys to shed light on somewhat abstract issues that 
affect national or subnational populations, such as the health of democracy, confidence in 
political institutions, and the relative merits of political leaders (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 98). 
By asking a series of questions on such issues, surveys can provide accurate and comparable 
results into how a population feels at a certain point in time. Survey results must be treated 
with caution, however, because the accuracy and utility can be degraded if questions are 
phrased ambiguously, if the questions or the survey itself is too long, and especially if 
respondents do not answer in an honest and truthful way (Bailey, 1982, pp. 87–88; Burnham 
et al., 2008, pp. 113–118; Ellis, 1994, pp. 181–183). With these caveats in mind, this article 
interprets the results of survey data with caution and seeks to improve the accuracy of its 
findings by comparing the results of various surveys. 
 
The main source of data is the World Values Survey (WVS), which uses a common 
questionnaire to study ‘changing values and their impact on social and political life’ (WVSA, 
2015), including immigration. WVS respondents are at least 18 years of age, and each sample 
is at least 1,000 people in size. South Korea is one of only 20 societies to be included in all six 
WVS ‘waves’, and one of the relatively few non-Western societies that has been included in 
each wave. The first wave (1981–4) was conducted before the democratic elections in 1988, so 
the surveys are a means of analysing continuity and change in public opinion about 
immigration during the ROK’s democratic era. Since the most recent survey was conducted in 
2010, however, this article also uses the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), which was 
conducted annually from 2003 until 2012. The KGSS samples 2,000 adults aged 18 and over 
on a wide range of social issues, including ‘trust of people and institutions, government 
performance... environmental issues, and international migration’ (Inter-university Consortium 
for Political and Social Research, 2015b). This survey, however, only intensively focused on 
immigration in 2003 and 2010. A third source of data, therefore, were surveys such as the one 
sponsored by the Korea Women’s Development Institute (Han and Seol, 2006) the East Asia 
Institute (EAI, 2005 and 2010), and the East Asia Social Survey (EASS), which was conducted 
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in 2006, 2008 and 2010 (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2015a). 
We also cite opinion polls that are relevant to this study. 
 
General Perceptions of Immigration 
In analysing public perceptions of immigration in the ROK, this article distinguishes between 
migrants as workers, neighbours and citizens. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but 
they allow us to analyse how the South Korean public perceives the main cohorts of migrants. 
First, however, Table 1 briefly explores some general attitudes towards immigration in the 
ROK. The responses to several questions from the KGSS and a Gallup survey (Gallup 
International Association, 2012) illustrates that in general South Koreans agree with the notion 
that immigration improves society due to its capacity to introduce new ideas and culture. Gallup 
found that the ROK was one of comparatively few societies where immigrants were deemed 
to have a net positive effect. Majorities or near-majorities of respondents to the KGSS agreed 
that immigration had an economic benefit for South Korea. 
 
Table 1: Benefits of Immigration 
 2003        2010       
 
– Immigrants improve South 
Korean society by bringing in 
new ideas and cultures. 
– Immigrants are generally 
good for the South Korean 
economy 
– Immigrants have a positive 
effect on society (2012) 
Agree 
 
 
27.8 
 
 
53.8 
Disagree 
 
 
26.2 
 
 
15.5 
Neither 
 
 
43.4 
 
 
29.8 
Agree 
 
 
30.5 
 
 
49.1 
 
40 
Disagree 
 
 
24.6 
 
 
15.1 
 
23 
Neither 
 
 
42.7 
 
 
34.4 
 
34 
‘Agree’: ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree’ 
‘Disagree’: ‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Disagree’ 
Neither: ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘don’t know’, and/or ‘can’t choose’ 
 
Sources: Korean General Social Survey (2003; 2010); Gallup International Association 
(2012) 
 
This data suggests that more South Koreans had a positive rather than a negative view of 
immigration, but also that there is no consensus about the issue: a substantial proportion neither 
agreed nor disagreed with statements about immigration. For instance in response to 
‘Immigrants improve South Korean society by bringing in new ideas and cultures’, people were 
far more likely to say ‘neither/don’t know’ than to agree or disagree. Nearly half of respondents 
(46.9%) in the 2010 KGSS agreed that well-off countries have an ‘obligation to allow the 
immigration from a worse-off country’. This was the most popular response, but more than 
half of respondents disagreed or had no opinion about an issue of vital importance to their 
society. 
 
Migrants as Workers 
To analyse how the South Korean public perceives migrants as workers, this article focuses on 
the scale of immigration, the place of foreign workers in labour markets, and especially whether 
they pose a threat to local employment. The migrants in question are mainly low-skilled manual 
labourers in sectors such as manufacturing and construction. Few are allowed to reside 
permanently in the ROK. Most are non-ethnic Korean men.  
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In 2008, the East Asian Social Survey asked whether the number of foreign workers should be 
increased or decreased. Half of respondents (49.9%) said that there should be fewer foreign 
workers, 19.9% called for a higher number, and the remainder said the number should stay the 
same. Almost 80% of South Koreans, therefore, did not want the number of foreign workers to 
increase any further. The KGSS asked the same question in 2010, and found less opposition to 
foreign workers if a distinction was drawn between blue-collar workers, professionals, and 
investors. As Table 2 shows, there was a clear preference for the most skilled and wealthy of 
foreign workers. Even for blue-collar workers, responses were almost evenly split between 
those who wanted a greater number, a lesser one, and for the number to stay about the same. 
 
Table 2: Types of Foreign Workers 
Would you like _______ to increase or decrease in 
Korea? 
 
– Blue-collar foreign workers 
– Professional foreign workers 
– Foreign businessman and investor 
Increase 
 
 
30.7 
47.5 
75.7 
Decrease 
 
 
35.0 
24.1 
10.9 
Stay the 
same 
 
 
32.0 
25.9 
8.4 
Increase: ‘increase greatly’ and ‘increase some’ 
Decrease: ‘decrease greatly’ and ‘decrease some’ 
 
Source: Korean General Social Survey, 2010 
 
The World Values Survey contains evidence that South Koreans are concerned about the 
impact of foreign workers on labour markets. There is a consistent preference for nationals 
should be employed ahead of foreign workers. The degree to which Koreans agree with the 
statement, however, depends largely on how the issue is framed. A substantial majority agreed 
that: ‘When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over 
immigrants’, although the level of agreement declined from 90% in 1996 to 70% in 2010. The 
KGSS had a similar item in 2005, but the phrasing – and responses – were quite different. Just 
over half of respondents (50.9%) agreed that ‘Worker’s nationality is not an important criterion 
in hiring workers’, and 28.4% disagreed. One explanation for the differences is that the WVS 
framed the issue in terms of the ‘scarcity’ of jobs, whereas the KGSS asked whether it was 
appropriate to give preference to South Koreans in hiring. 
 
Several surveys have asked whether immigrants are a ‘threat’ to local employment. In a 2006 
survey funded by the Korea Women’s Development Institute, about 40% of respondents 
‘largely’ or ‘strongly’ agreed that foreign workers were a ‘threat to employment’, and 29.8% 
‘somewhat’ agreed or were ‘half and half’ on the issue (Han & Seol, 2006, p. 158). In the 2010 
East Asia Institute survey, 40.3% of respondents said that immigrants threatened local 
employment (C.-h. Gang, 2014). If the lukewarm responses (‘somewhat’, ‘half and half’) were 
omitted from Han and Seol’s study, the two surveys produce quite similar results. The KGSS, 
meanwhile, asked whether ‘Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in South 
Korea’. Perhaps due to the less emotive phrasing (‘take jobs away’ as opposed to ‘threaten 
employment’), only 23.1% agreed in 2003, and 28.2% in 2010. By contrast, 46.8% and 40.4% 
of respondents disagreed. 
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Figure 1: Attitudes towards Foreign 
Workers
0
20
40
60
80
1996 2001 2005
Restrictive stance Permissive stance
 
Source: World Values Survey, 1996, 2001, 2005. 
 
Figure 1 provides more detail about how South Koreans view foreign workers. A majority of 
respondents to the WVS in 2001 and 2005 were content for foreigners to work, ‘as long as jobs 
are available’. When combined with respondents who said ‘let anyone come’, those had a 
‘permissive stance’ on foreign workers outnumbered those who had a ‘restrictive stance’ 
(‘strict limits’, ‘prohibit people coming’). In each of the three years that the question was asked, 
South Koreans with a relatively permissive approach to foreign workers outnumbered those 
who supported retrictions on foreign labour. 
 
Table 3: Permissive Stance on Foreign Workers 
 1996 2001 2005 
Sample average 
 
Under 29 
30–49 
50 and above 
 
Male 
Female 
 
Primary school 
University degree 
49.2 
 
50.7 
51.2 
46.3 
 
52.3 
46.2 
 
38.4 
54.1 
56.2 
 
68.5 
52.2 
50.9 
 
58.2 
54 
 
26.1 
71.7 
59.1 
 
74.5 
58.7 
48.7 
 
59.5 
58.6 
 
55.6 
68.7 
Permissive stance: ‘Let anyone come’ and ‘As long as jobs are available’ 
 
Source: World Values Survey, various years 
 
Table 3 analyses the WVS data into more detail, by considering how age, gender and education 
affects views of foreign workers. When age is considered, young people (29 and under) were 
significantly more likely than the sample population to have a ‘permissive’ stance. This was 
especially pronounced in 2001 and 2005, when young people exceeded the sample average by 
more than 10%. The 30–49 age group was much closer to the sample average, and exceeded it 
in two of the surveys. Older respondents (50 and above) were the least responsive to calls to 
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relax restrictions on foreign labour. Unlike the sample as a whole (and the other two cohorts), 
there was no linear trend towards a more permissive stance for older respondents. This cohort’s 
views of foreign workers changed to a much lower degree than other cohorts and the sample 
as a whole. 
 
When gender is analysed, men were more closely aligned with the sample population. Men 
were slightly more likely to adopt a permissive stance on foreign workers than the sample, 
while women were slightly less likely to do so. The gender gap narrowed substantially across 
the three surveys, however, such that there was only a difference of 0.7% in 2005. 
 
There was a strong correlation between education and a willingness to accept foreign workers. 
People with a university degree were the most likely to have more permissive attitudes, and 
they consistently exceeded the sample average. Respondents with only a primary education 
were far less favourable in their attitudes to foreign workers. In 1996 and 2001, this cohort 
supported a ‘restrictive’ stance rather than a ‘permissive’ one. The results were reversed in 
2005, however, when support for the permissive stance easily exceeded the alternative (55.6 
versus 44.5%). For younger, better-educated respondents, immigrants (many of whom are 
unskilled) were perhaps less threatening than for respondents who were older, who had attained 
a lower degree of education, and for whom therefore immigrants represented a more genuine 
threat to employment. 
 
Migrants as Neighbours 
In analysing migrants as neighbours, the article focuses on how close South Koreans feel to 
specific cohorts of foreigners, the degree to which they trust people (including foreigners), and 
how comfortable they feel about having foreigners as neighbours. The cohort of most relevant 
here are the ‘marriage migrants’. Of the 173,000 people who have attained citizenship of the 
ROK since 1948, almost 80% of have done so through marriage to South Korean (KIS Statistics, 
2014, pp. 618–619). 
 
Table 4 illustrates how South Koreans perceive various cohorts of foreigners. The EAI survey 
of 2010 asked respondents ot situate cohorts of foreigners on a spectrum from ‘complete 
stranger’ to ‘citizen of South Korea’. The cohorts deemed to be closest to survey respondents 
were the children of international marriages (i.e., between a South Korean and a foreigner), 
North Korean refugees, and marriage migrants. Chinese–Koreans were judged to be more or 
less equivalent to South Korean citizens. Migrant labourers, dual citizens and South Koreans 
who hold foreign citizenship, however, were at the ‘stranger’ end of the spectrum. Of all the 
cohorts, migrant workers were the most ‘distant’ from South Koreans. 
 
Table 4: Psychological distance about each cohort (percentages) 
 Stranger Citizen 
Children of international marriages 
North Korean defectors 
Marriage migrants 
Joseonjeok (Chinese Koreans) 
Koreans living abroad with foreign citizenship 
Koreans living in South Korea with foreign citizenship 
18.8 
28.7 
29.5 
39.7 
53.9 
54.7 
81.2 
71.4 
70.5 
60.3 
46.1 
45.2 
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Dual citizens of South Korea and foreign states 
Migrant labourers 
56.2 
61.4 
43.8 
38.6 
‘Stranger’: ‘a complete stranger’ and ‘almost a stranger’ 
‘Citizen’: ‘almost a citizen of South Korea’ and ‘a citizen of South Korea’ 
 
Source: (W.-t. Gang, 2011, p. 16) 
 
In 2008 the KGSS found that only 21.5% of respondents wanted the number of foreign brides 
to increase. This was less than the shares of respondents who said that the number of foreign 
brides should remain at the current number (29%) or be reduced (46.3%). These results are 
similar to those for foreign workers, which were noted in the previous section (19.9%, 27.1% 
and 49.9%). Two years later, the sentiment towards foreign brides had improved a little: there 
was a modest increase in respondents who were in favour of more foreign brides or 
maintenance of the status quo (26.7%; 33.8%), and fewer calls for the number of foreign brides 
to be reduced (36.8%). 
 
The WVS data indicates a slow decline in the level of ‘trust’ in South Korea. About one third 
of respondents said that ‘most people can be trusted’ in 1982 and 1990 (with a high of 36% in 
1982), but this proportion fell to about 27% in 2001, 2005 and 2010. Table 5 shows that South 
Koreans trusted family more than any other social cohort. People known personally (i.e., 
friends) and neighbours are also trusted to high degrees. The most distrusted cohorts were 
people met for the first time, people of other religions, and people of other nationalities. The 
WVS measured trust in specific social cohorts in 2005 and 2010. Levels of trust in foreigners 
was relatively low, but rose 4.4% between 2005 and 2010. This exceeded trust levels for the 
general population, but was far less than trust in family, friends and neighbours. 
 
Table 5: Trust in Various Social Cohorts 
 2005 2010 
Sample average 
 
Family 
People you know personally 
People in neighbourhood 
People of another religion 
People of another nationality 
People you meet for the first time 
28.0 
 
99.3 
83.6 
72.2 
41.7 
27.1 
14.9 
26.5 
 
97.7 
80.7 
72.2 
39.8 
31.5 
19.0 
Trust: ‘trust completely’ and ‘trust somewhat’ 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 2005 and 2010 
 
Table 6 analyses trust in foreigners in more detail. As is the case with foreign workers (see 
previous section), age and education are generally good predictors of a more positive attitude 
towards foreigners, while gender has more mixed results. In terms of age, younger respondents 
were generally more trusting of foreigners than older respondents were, but age was not a 
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consistent predictor of attitudes. Those aged 30–49 were the most trusting of foreigners. In 
2005 younger respondents were the least trusting of foreigners, and reported even less trust 
than people aged 50 and over. In 2010, however, younger respondents’ level of trust mirrored 
the sample average, while older respondents were less trusting than the sample. 
 
When considering gender, there was an increase in levels of trust for both men and women. In 
2005, men recorded higher levels of trust in foreigners than women, but in 2010 the results 
were reversed: women’s levels of trust increased by 7.8%, while for men the increase was only 
0.7%. The increase in women’s trust in foreigners in some ways mirrors the results of the earlier 
question about attitudes to foreign workers: women shifted from levels of trust far below those 
of men to rough parity with men. 
 
Levels of education were generally correlated with trust in foreigners: highly educated people 
usually trusted foreigners more, but the trend was not uniform. In 2005, respondents with 
technical or vocational high school-levels of education reported higher levels of trust than those 
with a university education. In 2010, however, the results reverted to type, and education-
attainment was again positively correlated with trust in foreigners. 
 
Table 6: Trust in People of Another Nationality 
 2005 2010 
Trust completely 
Trust somewhat 
Overall Trust (sample average): 
 
Under 29 
30–49 
50 and above 
 
Male 
Female 
 
Primary school 
High school (technical/vocational type) 
High school (university-preparatory type) 
University degree 
1.7 
25.4 
27.1 
 
22.6 
31.8 
23 
 
29.9 
24.4 
 
19.1 
40.5 
28.6 
33.7 
2.0 
29.5 
31.5 
 
31.5 
34.5 
27.9 
 
30.6 
32.5 
 
26.8 
26.0 
28.8 
40.8 
Source: World Values Survey, 2005 and 2010 
 
The WVS regularly asks host populations about their willingness to have foreigners as 
neighbours. In South Korea, the lowest levels of discomfort (i.e., highest levels of comfort) 
with having foreigners as neighbours were recorded in 1982, and sentiment against foreigners 
was strongest in 1990 survey (see Table 7). Thereafter, South Koreans have reported less 
discomfort with living near foreigners. The lowest level of discomfort was reported in the 2005 
survey (38.4%), and the highest (53.4%) in 1990. About one third of respondents said that they 
were uncomfortable with their neighbours being foreigners, speaking a foreign language, or 
being of a different race. 
 
Table 7: Discomfort with Foreigners as Neighbours 
 1982 1990 1996 2001 2005 2010 
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People of a different race 
People of a different religion 
People who speak a different language 
Immigrants/Foreign workers 
Muslims 
14.3 
 
 
3.7 
25.9 
57.9 
 
 
53.4 
20.9 
 
 
 
38.5 
34.7 
 
 
46.8 
57.3 
36.3 
26.1 
31.8 
38.4 
34.1 
31.1 
33.3 
44.2 
Source: World Values Survey, various years 
 
Table 8 analyses how South Koreans think about the possibility of having foreign neighbours 
in more detail. Age again acts as a reliable predictor of attitudes towards foreigners. In the five 
surveys for which a detailed breakdown of data is available (1990–2010), the youngest 
respondents were the most comfortable with having foreign neighbours. The exception was in 
1996, when the 30–49 cohort recorded the lowest level of discomfort. The level of discomfort 
for the 30–49 cohort was at or below 40% in three surveys, and responses from this cohort 
most closely resembled the sample average. The oldest cohort were the least comfortable with 
having foreign neighbours; only once, in 2005, was the discomfort level below 50%. 
 
In terms of gender, there was no clear pattern to responses. Men reported higher levels of 
comfort (i.e., less discomfort) than women in four surveys. Discomfort levels of male 
respondents settled into a relatively narrow range from 1996 onwards (40.8–45.9%). The 
responses of women, by contrast, varied much more over time. Compared to those of men, 
women’s responses tended to be closer to the sample average. This suggests that men’s views 
of foreigners tended to remain largely the same regardless of specific events, but specific 
incidents relating to foreigners may have influenced women’s views. 
 
Some variation was evident in terms of education. In 1990 and 1996, respondents who were 
most comfortable with having foreign neighbours had the lowest levels of education; people 
with more education were the least comfortable. In the three surveys since 2001, however, the 
results were quite different: people with higher levels of education reported the greatest degree 
of comfort with having foreign neighbours. One possibility is that the Asian economic crisis of 
the late 1990s, which had a severe effect on the South Korean economy, impacted on society 
in quite different ways. Job losses may have affected those with the least levels of income and 
education more severely than the better educated. The drop in support for having foreign 
neighbours for all cohorts without university education in 2001, from its high point of 1996, 
would support this supposition. 
 
Table 8: Discomfort with Foreigners as Neighbours: Detailed Analysis 
 1982 1990 1996 2001 2005 2010 
Sample average: 
 
Under 29 
30–49 
50 and above 
 
Male 
Female 
 
Primary school 
High school (technical/vocational type) 
High school (university-preparatory type) 
University degree 
3.7 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6 
4.7 
 
53.4 
 
37.8 
48.6 
56.8 
 
51.2 
55.3 
 
31.3 
40.5 
54.5 
64.9 
38.5 
 
44.3 
39.0 
70.0 
 
42.3 
34.9 
 
29.1 
27.6 
38.6 
48.1 
46.8 
 
36.9 
46.0 
60.3 
 
45.9 
47.8 
 
58.7 
60.8 
50.3 
36.5 
38.4 
 
33.6 
35.7 
45.9 
 
40.8 
36.0 
 
45.2 
43.2 
34.0 
32.3 
44.2 
 
39.0 
40.5 
51.9 
 
43.5 
44.8 
 
63.3 
46.8 
44.6 
35.6 
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Source: World Values Survey, various years  
 
These findings largely accord with the survey supported by the Korea Women's Development 
Institute, which found that just under 10% of South Koreans were ‘strongly resistant’ or 
‘resistant’ to the idea of foreigners living in their neighbourhood. A far greater proportion of 
respondents (41.5%) said that they ‘favoured’ or ‘strongly favoured’ the presence of foreigners. 
Almost half of respondents (48.6%) had no strong feelings either way (Han & Seol, 2006, p. 
162). These substantial non-committal responses may mask an unspoken discomfort with 
foreigners. These findings do not indicate that South Koreans are fully comfortable about living 
near foreigners, but the reported balance of sentiment was closer to comfort rather than 
discomfort. 
 
Migrants as Citizens 
In analysing perceptions of migrants as citizens, this article focuses on whether South Koreans 
feel that their society needs to become more accommodating to non-ethnic Koreans; the 
markers of national identity, and what it means to be Korean; and how easy it is for migrants 
to become citizens. A relatively small number of foreigners have become South Korean citizens. 
As noted in the previous section, marriage migrants, constitute a substantial share of new 
citizens. Another cohort are escapees (‘defectors’) from North Korea. Article 3 of the Republic 
of Korea’s Constitution claims that the entire Korean Peninsula and adjacent islands fall within 
the borders of the ROK, so North Korean defectors area treated as nationals (Mylonas, 2013). 
North Koreans are generally granted citizenship soon after arrival in the South, so their 
experience is distinct from other groups of newcomers. 
 
Citizenship is the ultimate measure of social acceptance, and it has significant implications for 
how political communities are defined. Expanding the political community, by allowing 
immigrants to become citizens, changes the constitution of society. In 2006, Han and Seol 
asked whether ‘South Korea needs to become a multicultural society’, and 42.4% of 
respondents agreed. In the same survey, only 27.8% of people said that ‘South Korea needs to 
maintain its ‘united and homogenous society’, or danil minjok sahoe (2006, pp. 156, 157). Four 
years later, the EAI survey asked a similar question. A majority of respondents (60.6%) agreed 
that ‘South Korea must become a multicultural and multiethnic society instead of a united and 
homogenous state (danil minjok gukka)’ (C.-h. Gang, 2014). In 2005, the WVS asked South 
Koreans how ethnic diversity affected their national identity. On a scale of 1 (‘Ethnic diversity 
erodes a country’s unity’) to 10 (‘ethnic diversity enriches my life’), most respondents 
positioned themselves at the ‘enrichment’ end of the scale: 44.1% gave scores of 1 to 5, and 
55.8% gave a response of 6 to 10. 
 
According to one scholar, ‘Blood ties are the most fundamental condition for claiming a place 
in the [South Korean] nation’ (C. Lee, 2012, p. 95). This may be true when citizenship is viewed 
from the perspective of policymakers, but the EAI surveys of 2005 and 2010 found that most 
South Koreans no longer considered ‘bloodline’ to be the most important marker of national 
identity. Instead, the most important facet was ‘holding South Korean citizenship’. By contrast, 
‘bloodline’ was the sixth-ranked (i.e., the second lowest) choice in 2010, after being the fourth-
ranked choice in 2005 (W.-t. Gang, 2011). An Asan Institute poll from 2013, which asked 
South Koreans how they define national identity, arrived at similar findings (Kim, 2014, p. 99). 
Table 9 provides averages of the three polls, and ranks the results in ascending order. 
 
Table 9: Elements of South Korean National Identity 
 2005 2010 2013 Average 
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Use the Korean language 
Hold South Korean citizenship 
Understand Korean history and respect its traditions and 
customs 
Respect the South Korean political system and its laws 
Be born in South Korea 
Have Korean blood 
Live most of one’s life in South Korea 
87.0 
88.2 
80.9 
 
77.5 
81.9 
80.9 
64.6 
87.8 
89.4 
85.9 
 
87.3 
87.7 
84.1 
78.2 
91.7 
88.4 
91.5 
 
93.4 
69.0 
65.8 
66.1 
88.8 
88.7 
86.1 
 
86.1 
79.5 
76.9 
69.6 
Note: percentage of respondents who agree that an element is ‘important’ to national identity 
 
Sources: EAI surveys (2005, 2010); Asan Institute poll (2013), cited in Kim (2014, p. 99). 
 
By this reckoning, the most important elements of national identity are the ability to use the 
Korean language fluently; being a citizen; respecting the political system and its laws; and 
understanding Korean history, traditions and customs. There is a discernible gap between the 
importance placed on these four markers of identity and other markers (bloodline; being born 
in South Korea; living in the ROK). The two elements of national identity that have increased 
the most are ‘respecting the political system and its laws’, and ‘understanding Korean history, 
traditions and customs’. It is thus conceivable for non-ethnic Koreans to receive both formal 
recognition as citizens (i.e., by attaining a passport), but also informal, societal-level 
recognition, in the eyes of South Koreans. 
 
Of all potential citizens, North Koreans have traditionally had the most straightforward path to 
formal citizenship. An Asan poll conducted in 2013 suggests that South Koreans have warmer 
feelings towards North Korean defectors than towards immigrants from China, the US and 
Japan (Kim, 2014, p. 104). As Table 10 indicates, however, North Koreans are no longer, or 
not automatically, deemed to have a special place in the South Korean imaginary. In both 2011 
and 2012, the proportion of respondents who felt ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ distant from North 
Korean defectors was slightly larger than those who felt ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ close. There was 
also a slight decrease in the proportion of those who had a positive view of admitting defectors. 
About half of respondents favoured unconditional acceptance of defectors (‘all should be 
admitted’), but there was a slight increase in respondents who opposed admitting North 
Koreans. Almost 40% of respondents in both years favoured ‘selectively’ admitting defectors. 
Concern about the plight of North Koreans has dropped in the past decade, especially among 
young people. In 2005, 36.8% of South Koreans said that they had ‘no interest’ in the North 
Korean people, but this figure increased to 53.4% in 2015. People in their 20s and 30s recorded 
the highest levels of disinterest: 63.5% and 59.6%, respectively (N.-Y. Lee, Lee, & Hwang, 
2015). 
 
Table 10: Views of North Korean refugees 
 2011 2012 
How close or distant do you feel about North Korean defectors who stay in 
South Korea? 
– Feel very close/feel somewhat close 
– Feel very distant /feel somewhat distant 
 
 
 
49.1 
50.6 
 
 
 
49.5 
50.5 
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What do you think about North Korean defectors who want to come to South 
Korea?  
– All should be admitted 
– Should be admitted selectively 
– Should not be admitted any more 
 
 
51.5 
38.6 
9.8 
 
 
49.9 
38.6 
11.5 
Source: Korean General Social Survey (2011; 2012) 
 
A number of surveys have detected a willingness to ease restrictions on acquiring South Korean 
citizenship. In 2004, for instance, 56% of respondents agreed that ‘the restrictive regulations 
barring foreigners from acquiring South Korean citizenship should be relaxed’ (Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations & East Asia Institute, 2005). This willingness to countenance an 
easing of restrictions is also apparent in other surveys, but responses differ greatly depending 
on the potential citizens in question. In particular, respondents were much more open to the 
notion of citizenship being granted to children (those born in South Korea to non-Korean 
parents, or those born abroad with at least one South Korean parent), but much less so in the 
case of foreign workers. 
 
As Table 11 shows, the KGSS detected strong support for the rights of children to become 
citizens. In 2003 and 2010, support for the rights of children born abroad with at least one 
South Korean parent was 80% or higher. For children born in the ROK of non-Korean parents, 
support for the right to citizenship was slightly less emphatic, but it rose substantially between 
2003 and 2010. 
 
Table 11: Children and Citizenship 
 2003 2010 
Children born abroad should have the right to become South Korean citizens 
if at least one of their parents is a South Korean citizen. 
 
Children born in South Korea of parents who are not citizens should have the 
right to become South Korean citizens. 
 
79.9 
 
 
69.5 
 
80.8 
 
 
81.5 
Note: percentage of respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ 
 
Source: Korean General Social Survey (2003; 2010) 
 
Support for the rights of foreign workers to attain citizenship, however, was much lower. Most 
respondents (61.4%) to Han and Seol’s study favoured changes to immigration laws that would 
make it easier for foreign workers to gain citizenship (2006, p. 159). In the 2010 EAI survey, 
however, 69.1% of South Koreans disagreed when asked if foreigners should be able to acquire 
citizenship easily (C.-h. Gang, 2014). One explanation for the difference in results may have 
been that Han and Seol’s question implied that there would only be an increase in the number 
of foreign workers attaining citizenship as a result of legislative change, whereas the EAI 
survey item could be construed to mean that the government could arbitrarily – and perhaps 
recklessly – ease immigration laws. So the wording of the question matters: if it is not implied 
that gaining citizenship was ‘easy’, South Koreans appear open to the notion of immigrants 
becoming citizens. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has illustrated that immigration in South Korea is a divisive issue. Age and 
education are reasonably strong predictors of attitudes towards immigration. A majority 
(predominantly the young and well educated) favours easing restrictions on foreign workers, 
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is comfortable with living around foreigners, and accepts that non-ethnic Koreans can qualify 
for citizenship. However, a minority (the older and the less-well educated segments of society) 
oppose, or are uncomfortable with, the changes that immigration necessitates. The article found 
a less clear relationship between gender and views on immigration. By a small but diminishing 
margin, men were more willing than women to support policies to reduce restrictions on foreign 
labour. In more recent surveys, however, women reported higher levels of comfort with having 
foreign neighbours than men did. Given these unexplained fluctuations, further research should 
be conducted into how gender – along with variables such as income and region – influences 
attitudes to immigration. In particular, it would be valuable to learn whether participants’ views 
on immigration are influenced mainly by short-term, recent events (i.e., a reaction to incidents 
such as crimes committed by immigrants, or terrorist attacks), or whether they are a reflection 
of attitudes that have developed over a longer period of time. 
 
The potency of the opposing minority cannot be underestimated. In fact, the data reviewed in 
this article may understate the degree of opposition to immigration. A shortcoming of survey 
research is that some participants may not provide honest responses to sensitive topics 
(Burnham et al., 2008). Respondents may have avoided disagreeing with statements about 
immigration, for fear of being accused of being racist or xenophobic. It is also possible that 
respondents did not feel capable of offering an opinion on some topics, such as whether or not 
immigration is ‘good’ for society. Immigration on a permanent and expanding basis is a 
genuinely new phenomenon in South Korea, so some confusion and doubt about it may be 
inevitable. Future surveys of immigration might therefore pay particular attention to the 
wording of questions, in order to minimise confusion and embarrassment on the part of 
participants, and also ensure that results are as reliable and therefore useful as possible. 
 
Language matters in politics. Issues framed in catch-all terms such as ‘foreigners’ or ‘foreign 
workers’ tended to generate less sympathetic responses than ones that disaggregated – that is, 
humanised – migrants. When respondents were asked to think about specific cohorts of 
foreigners – whether blue-collar workers, the children of international marriages, or North 
Korean refugees – there was a greater degree of empathy than if ‘immigrants’ were treated as 
a totality. Issue framing, therefore, affects the choices available in immigration policy and the 
likelihood that the public will support a specific policy proposal. As the status of migrants in 
South Korea becomes more prominent, immigration may emerge as a potent electoral issue. It 
is not hard to imagine a conservative government harnessing anti-immigrant sentiment to 
mobilise its traditional voting blocs. Given that other democratic societies have experienced 
similar incidents of anti-immigrant sentiment, placing the findings of this study in comparative 
perspective would be a way to better assess the significance of the ROK’s experience with 
immigration. 
 
The politics of immigration in South Korea are fiercely contested because ethnic and racial 
purity has traditionally played such a central role in the formation of national identity. Given 
the differences between the ROK and Western societies in terms of their cultures, histories of 
immigration and the economic contribution of foreign workers, it seems unlikely that South 
Korea will fully adopt European-style multiculturalism. Equally unlikely, however, is a 
continuation of the communitarian logic that has hitherto informed the ROK’s approach to 
immigrant integration. A more accommodating mode of immigration integration appears 
necessary, and achieving it will pose a challenge to South Korea’s youthful democracy. 
Pluralist societies are capable of accommodating diverse cultural groups, but they usually 
require a relatively long period of time to acquire the political skills required to handle such 
challenges. The lack of consensus about immigration in the ROK does not need to be seen in 
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negative terms. On the contrary, it offers an opportunity for policymakers to develop an 
approach that is best able to respond to South Korea’s need for more new citizens in the coming 
decades. How well these leaders cope with the politics of immigration may well determine the 
degree of social harmony and national prosperity that the ROK enjoys in the decades ahead. 
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